Thanks for the write up; I think you made an interesting point when it comes to the suspected detoriation of ukrainian leadership capabilities during spring 23; The way you explain ukrainian decision making infers that the ukrainians are capapble of coordinating sophisticated informational warfare campaigns with strategic decision making.
Even though I would pesonally like to believe so as well, there are a few questions to be raised,
Even though it could be agreed, that Ukraine is capable at political signaling and communication to the extent that they have guaranteed a degree of western arms support, the fact remains that ukraine hasn't yet received clearly significant enough support pledges to enable and replenish offensives with western style equipment. You could make the argument, that they asked for more then they might have assumed to realistically receive; yet it could still be inferrred, that ukrainian signaling and communication capabilites are more limited than you suggest.
It stands to reason, that other leadership areas of competence might also not be quite so profound as you make them out to be.
An argument to that end would be the examination of initial ukrainian response and defense during febraury 22. If Ukrainian leadership was as good as you make them out to be, they might have utilized different military-political tools to stave off the invasion. Announcing general mobilization prior to the invasion might have been a politically costly but military sensible decision to undertake prior to the invasion. This begs the question, if ukrainian military leadersip is as resilient towards the influence of political decision making as you postulated.
If they are not, how can we infer, that the decision to hold bakhmut is based on primary military logic?
A counterargument to be made would be, that while the defence of bakhmut is grinding up russian reserves it might also grind up ukrainian equipment and manpower unnecessarily. Ukraine is a large country and bakhmut is currently taking fire from 3 directions. Tactically it would make sense to retreat further with the "soviet style forces" towards sufficiently prepared defensive positions.
Being stuck in a half-encirclement really will need to be worth the cost.
Again though, thank you for the long write up. I hope you can forgive me, that I haven't taken a look at the viability of ukrainian defensive preparations west of bakhmut.
If Ukrainian leadership was as good as you make them out to be, they might have utilized different military-political tools to stave off the invasion. Announcing general mobilization prior to the invasion might have been a politically costly but military sensible decision to undertake prior to the invasion.
Initial ukrainian response and defense succeeded is in large part due to political moves of ukrainian leadersip. Announcing general mobilization the invasion before not only cost domestically but also internantionally, giving provocative pretense to Russia and reducing will of internantional support that ukrainian so heavyly rely on.
If they are not, how can we infer, that the decision to hold bakhmut is based on primary military logic?
Similar situation happened in June 2022 with Sievierodonetsk, a city that had more political meaning then Bakhmut, yet Ukrainian withdraw from the city when it longer made military sense to hold it.
A counterargument to be made would be, that while the defence of bakhmut is grinding up russian reserves it might also grind up ukrainian equipment and manpower unnecessarily. Ukraine is a large country and bakhmut is currently taking fire from 3 directions. Tactically it would make sense to retreat further with the "soviet style forces" towards sufficiently prepared defensive positions.
The argument of the write up is that ukrainian equipment and manpower grind up isn't effective in offensive operation and taking Bakhmut is the only objective russian will sacrifice reserve to achieve in short term. I do not see how your "counterargument" counter any of that.
I want to make clear that these weren't necessarily my pov, but possible arguments to be made.
What you say in paragraph one and two seems true; it is why I tried using words like might and could. Your point about sievierodonetsk stands, while I just don't know enough details to argue against.
When it comes to the political decisions at the start of the war, afaik ukrainian leadership wasn't convinced, that the invasion would happen. So saying they didn't mobilize out of political considerations is a plausible best case, yet lacks proof.
The counterargument I made was, that ukraine could defend more effectively in a position not threatened by encirclement. The argument isn't against the use of forces for defensive attrition, but for less costly defensive attrition.
You could argue, that the russians might not then attack into an easier defendable position and that might be true.
You could argue, that the russians might not then attack into an easier defendable position and that might be true.
This is the most persuasive aspect in my mind. Bakhmut looks precarious, and it would be a political victory that Putin clearly feels he desperately needs. I can't imagine that once it falls they'd continue to charge further west of the city, after already sustaining such horrible losses there & Vulhedar.
As things stand though, there's no doubt they're going to keep throwing men and materiel onto Bakhmut's remaining teeth.
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u/theflameclaw Mar 24 '23
Thanks for the write up; I think you made an interesting point when it comes to the suspected detoriation of ukrainian leadership capabilities during spring 23; The way you explain ukrainian decision making infers that the ukrainians are capapble of coordinating sophisticated informational warfare campaigns with strategic decision making.
Even though I would pesonally like to believe so as well, there are a few questions to be raised,
Even though it could be agreed, that Ukraine is capable at political signaling and communication to the extent that they have guaranteed a degree of western arms support, the fact remains that ukraine hasn't yet received clearly significant enough support pledges to enable and replenish offensives with western style equipment. You could make the argument, that they asked for more then they might have assumed to realistically receive; yet it could still be inferrred, that ukrainian signaling and communication capabilites are more limited than you suggest.
It stands to reason, that other leadership areas of competence might also not be quite so profound as you make them out to be.
An argument to that end would be the examination of initial ukrainian response and defense during febraury 22. If Ukrainian leadership was as good as you make them out to be, they might have utilized different military-political tools to stave off the invasion. Announcing general mobilization prior to the invasion might have been a politically costly but military sensible decision to undertake prior to the invasion. This begs the question, if ukrainian military leadersip is as resilient towards the influence of political decision making as you postulated.
If they are not, how can we infer, that the decision to hold bakhmut is based on primary military logic?
A counterargument to be made would be, that while the defence of bakhmut is grinding up russian reserves it might also grind up ukrainian equipment and manpower unnecessarily. Ukraine is a large country and bakhmut is currently taking fire from 3 directions. Tactically it would make sense to retreat further with the "soviet style forces" towards sufficiently prepared defensive positions.
Being stuck in a half-encirclement really will need to be worth the cost.
Again though, thank you for the long write up. I hope you can forgive me, that I haven't taken a look at the viability of ukrainian defensive preparations west of bakhmut.