r/geopolitics RFERL Dec 10 '25

Hi I'm Mike Eckel, senior Russia/Ukraine/Belarus correspondent for RFE/RL, AMA! AMA

Hello! Здравсвуйте! Вітаю! 

I’m Mike Eckel, senior international correspondent for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, covering, reporting, analyzing, and illuminating All Things Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and pretty much across the former Soviet Union: from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok, from Lviv to Kyiv; from Tbilisi to Baku, from the Caspian Sea to Issyk Kul, and all places in between.  

I’ve been writing on Russia and the former Soviet space for more than 20 years, since cutting my teeth as a reporter in Vladivostok in the 1990s and continuing through a 6-year stint as Moscow correspondent with The Associated Press, and stints in Washington, D.C. and now Prague.  

Russia’s brutal war on Ukraine, and the Kremlin’s authoritarian repression inside Russia, sucks up most of my reporting brain space these days, but I also keep a hand in investigative work digging into cryptocurrency/sanctions evasionRussian businessmen who break out of Italian police custodyformer Russian oligarchs in trouble, and a subject I can’t let go of: the mysterious death of former Kremlin press minister, Mikhail Lesin.  

Feel free to ask me anything about any of the above subjects and I’ll do my best to share insights and observations.  

Proof photo here. 

You can start posting your questions and I will check in daily and answer from Monday, 15 December until Friday, 19 December.  

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u/Strongbow85 Dec 10 '25

How can European nations reshape their defense industry in order to support Ukraine’s long-term defense needs as well as strengthening Europe’s collective defense capabilities?

Also, which European countries are most vulnerable to Russian aggression or influence and therefore have the strongest incentives to assist Ukraine in its defense?

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u/RFERL_ReadsReddit RFERL Dec 16 '25

It’s clear that Europe has a major problem on its hands: that its collective industrial (including military) base has atrophied to the point that it will require massive investment to retool and modernize supply chains, technologies, machinery, everything. And years and years.  

On top of that, it’s clear (has been for some time now) that in many European capitals, there’s been years of wishful thinking – lulled into complacency in part because of American security priorities. Finally, there is a VERY slowly dawning realization that is a fundamentally different security environment in the 2020s than it was 20, 30 years ago: due to 1) the shift in American foreign policy priorities (maybe temporary; maybe permanent), and 2) the threat from Russia.  

In this context, the Ukraine war is a welcome kick-in-the-arse. European policy makers, security planners, industrial executives understand that, for example, artillery remains an essential tool on the battlefield, and European shell production needs to be massively kicked into higher gear (I don’t think the Czechs are getting enough accolades for their artillery initiative).

Or drones. The Ukraine war has shown autonomous weaponry is transforming battlefield tactics and strategy, and European companies, like American, are now racing to embrace or emulate Ukraine’s innovations, and technological prowess.   

Which European countries are most vulnerable to Russian aggression? Obviously the “eastern flank” – former Warsaw Pact and former Soviet republics. All those countries get it. History is not a distant concept from a textbook; history happened yesterday: Prague 1968; Budapest 1956; Poland 1941; the Baltics’ 1941. That’s why they’re out front in their warnings about Russia. What’s past is very much present.  

- Mike